A Fateful Decision

Jul 01, 2023

This is a section of my draft Gettysburg Staff Ride Text. The massive work will become my Gettysburg trilogy. This is still a draft and it is evolving. Since I began it while on faculty at the Joint Forces Staff College, I have obtained collections of unit histories, after action reports, and letters which I will use to enrich the narrative. One thing that sets my work apart from many other histories of Gettysburg is how I try to draw out the humanity of the individuals involved in the battle, and my work to discuss the strategic, operational, and tactical choices that impacted the battle and show the leadership qualities, and the character of the people who made them.

I did that in my book Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: Religion and the Politics of Race in the Civil War Era and Beyond. That book began as an introductory chapter of the staff ride text to show my students that while it is important to understand the purely military aspects of a campaign, that it is equally important to understand the ideas, and ideology that motivate people to go to war, and to fight. My second book, which I am working on editing this summer, A Great War in an Age of Revolutionary Change, was also an introductory chapter to the staff ride text. It deals with the broader military, economic, sociological, informational, political, religious, diplomatic, and technological changes, innovations, and advances that took place before, during and in the aftermath of the war. These are things that still impact our lives today.

Finally, while we cannot forget that the Confederacy was founded on the idea of race based White Supremacy, and that most of its commanders including Robert E. Lee embraced that ideology, that others did not. Among them were Lee’s three Corps commanders at Gettysburg; James Longstreet, Richard Ewell, and A.P. Hill. The staff ride text, some of which you see today tries to show the reader the truth about each man.

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One of the most important things to understand about the Battle of Gettysburg, or any battle or campaign, is leadership as well as organizational structure and climate of command. Studying A.P. Hill’s Third Corps is important to understand how the action unfolds and what happens at Gettysburg, particularly on July 1st, 1863.

Much of the current U.S. Military’s operational decision making is based on what is called “Mission Command.” It is dependent of the ability of commanders at all levels to correctly understand the situation and issue orders that are understandable, and demands subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Essential to mission command is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command. At every stage of the Gettysburg campaign, General Robert E. Lee issued vague and often contradictory orders, at one point leading Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, commander of the Second Corps made the commented to his staff and senior leaders, “Why can’t a commanding General have someone on his staff who can write an intelligible order.” [1]

While the leaders at Gettysburg on both sides would be unaware of our current definition of Mission Command, they certainly would have been acquainted with the maxims of Napoleon, who many studied under Dennis Hart Mahan at West Point. Napoleon noted: “What are the conditions that make for the superiority of an army? Its internal organization, military habits in officers and men, the confidence of each in themselves; that is to say, bravery, patience, and all that is contained in the idea of moral means.”

Likewise, in a maxim that directly applies to the Confederate campaign in Pennsylvania, Napoleon noted, “To operate upon lines remote from each other and without communications between them, is a fault which ordinarily occasions a second. The detached column has orders only for the first day. Its operations for the second day depend on what has happened to the main body. Thus according to circumstances, the column wastes its time in waiting for orders, or it acts at random….” [2]

I have spent more time in this chapter developing the issues of the organization, leadership, climate of command, and relationships between leaders because of their importance to the campaign. From these, students should be able to draw lessons that apply to leadership, organization, and campaigning at the operational level of war.

Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill

As Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia began to concentrate near Cashtown after the reports that the Army of the Potomac was in Maryland, Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps was nearest to Gettysburg. Major General Harry Heth’s division led the corps and arrived on June 29th, followed by Major General Dorsey Pender’s division on the 30th. Hill ordered his last division under the command of Major General Richard Anderson to remain behind and join the corps on July 1st. [3]

On June 30th, Harry Heth sent Johnston Pettigrew’s Brigade to Gettysburg to “search the town for army supplies (shoes especially), and to return the same day.” [4] It was the first in a series of miscalculations that brought Lee’s army into a general engagement, which Lee wished to avoid.

The Third Corps was formed as part of the army’s reorganization following Stonewall Jackson’s death after the Battle of Chancellorsville. Hill had a stellar reputation as a division commander. His “Light Division” distinguished itself on numerous occasions, especially at Antietam where its timely arrival after a hard forced march from Harper’s Ferry helped save Lee’s army late in that battle. At Chancellorsville, Hill briefly succeeded Jackson until he too was wounded.

But, A.P. Hill was no stranger to controversy. The first was a clash with James Longstreet during the Seven Days battles. Longstreet placed Hill under arrest and Hill challenged Longstreet to a duel. Lee quickly defused the situation by assigning Hill to Jackson’s command, as Jackson was operating in a semi-independent assignment. [5]

Despite the move controversy continued between Hill and Jackson. They were involved in an intractable controversy with for nearly a year until Jackson’s death. Part of this was due to Hill’s hatred of Jackson’s intense, intolerant, and militant Christian faith. In an army filled with highly religious officers, even some who might be termed fanatical in terms of their beliefs, Hill was a skeptic who had little appreciation for officers who practiced their faith with excessive intensity, like Jackson who he believed were fanatics.

At one point during the invasion of Maryland prior to Antietam Jackson had Hill placed under arrest for the number of stragglers that he observed in Hill’s hard marching division as well as other errors that Jackson believed Hill had made. The dispute continued and the animosity deepened between the two men, and in January 1863 Hill asked Lee for a trial by courts-martial on charges preferred against him by Jackson. Lee refused this and wrote to Hill: “Upon examining the charges in question, I am of the opinion that the interests of the service do not require that they be tried, and therefore, returned them to General Jackson with an indorsement to that effect….” [6] Just before Chancellorsville Jackson wrote to Lee “I respectfully request that Genl. Hill be relieved of duty in my Corps.”, This time, Lee ignored the request, and though the two generals remained at loggerheads, they also stayed at their commands at Chancellorsville. [7]

Hill was recommended for promotion to Lieutenant General and command of the Third Corps by Lee on May 24th, 1863. He was promoted over Harvey Hill and Lafayette McLaws, who were both senior to him. The promotion of Hill displeased Longstreet, who considered McLaws “better qualified for the job” but who also felt that the command should have gone to Harvey Hill, whose “record was as good as that of Stonewall Jackson…but, not being a Virginian, he was not so well advertised.” [8]

Ambrose Hill was slightly built and high-strung. “Intense about everything”, Hill was “one of the army’s intense disbelievers in slavery.” [9] He hated slavery and the depreciations visited on blacks; having in 1850 responded to the lynching of a young black man in his home town of Lynchburg: “Shame, shame upon you all, good citizens…Virginia must crawl unless you vindicate good order or discipline and hang every son of a bitch connected with this outrage.” [10]

Hill was an 1847 graduate of West Point and briefly served in Mexico but saw no combat. He spent some time in the Seminole wars and in garrison duty along the East Coast. Due to his fragile health he spent 1855-1860 in the Coastal Survey, which was a Navy command. He resigned his commission just before Virginia’s secession, more due to family loyalty than a belief in secession. Hill “received his commission as colonel, and soon trained one of Johnston’s best regiments in the Valley.” [11] He commanded a brigade under Longstreet on the Peninsula and was promoted to Major General and command of a division in May 1862. He was plagued by health problems related to a case of Gonorreah that delayed his graduation from West Point. He also suffered from recurrent bouts of Malaria, Yellow Fever and Prostatitis, and the issue of prostatitis would show up again on the first day at Gettysburg.

Third Corps was emblematic of the “makeshift nature of the reorganization of the whole army.” [12] It was composed of three divisions; the most experienced being that of the recently promoted and hard-fighting Major General Dorsey Pender. Pender’s division, was built around four excellent brigades from Hill’s old “Light Division” one of which Pender had commanded before his promotion. Hill strongly recommended Pender’s promotion which was accepted by Lee. Pender found the command to be a heavy burden. He was “an intelligent, reflective man, deeply religious and guided by a strong sense of duty….” [13]

Hill’s second experienced division was that of Major General Richard Anderson. Anderson’s division was transferred from Longstreet’s First Corps, something else which failed to endear Hill to Longstreet. [14] The unassuming Anderson had distinguished himself as a brigade and division commander in Longstreet’s corps, but in “an army of prima donnas, he was a self-effacing man, neither seeking praise for himself nor winning support by bestowing it on others.” [15] At Chancellorsville he fought admirably and Lee wrote that Anderson was “distinguished for the promptness, courage, and skill with which he and his division executed every order.” [16] With four seasoned brigades under excellent commanders, the division was a good addition to Third Corps, although the transition from Longstreet’s stolid and cautious style of command to Hill’s impetuous nature introduced “another incalculable of the reshuffled army.” [17]

Major General Harry Heth

Major General Harry Heth’s division was the final infantry division assigned to the corps. This division was recently formed from two brigades of Hill’s old Light Division and “the two new brigades that Jefferson Davis had forced on an already disrupted army organization.” [18] The organization of this division, as well as its leadership, would be problematic in the days to come, especially on June 30th and July 1st, 1863.

Harry Heth like Dorsey Pender was also newly promoted to his grade. The action at Gettysburg would be his first test in division command. Heth was a native Virginian who was well connected politically, and due to his social charm had “many friends and bound new acquaintances to him” readily. [19] Heth was a West Point graduate who had an undistinguished academic career graduating last in the class of 1847. His career in the antebellum army was typical of many officers; he served “credibly in an 1855 fight with Sioux Indians,” but his only claim to fame was authoring the army’s marksmanship manual, which was published in 1858. [20]

Heth’s career in the Confederate army began in western Virginia where it was undistinguished. But, Heth was a protégé of Robert E. Lee who recommended him as a brigade commander to Jackson before Chancellorsville. Tradition states that of all his generals that Heth was the only one “whom Lee called by his first name.” [21] Hill had reservations about Heth and wrote to Lee about the choice of a successor for the Light Division. Hill wrote that while Heth was “a most excellent officer and gallant soldier,” in the coming campaign “my division under him, will not be half as effective as under Pender.” [22] Douglas Southall Freeman noted that Heth was “doomed to be one of those good soldiers…who consistently have bad luck.” [23]

Heth’s division was composed of two depleted brigades from the Light Division which had taken heavy casualties at Chancellorsville. Brigadier General James Archer’s brigade was raised in Alabama and Mississippi. It was “well led and had a fine combat reputation.” But the other brigade was more problematic. It was from Virginia, and it had once been considered one of the best in the army. However, it deteriorated in quality following the wounding of its first commander Brigadier General Charles Field. Heth took command of it at Chancellorsville where he and the brigade performed well. However, when Heth was promoted to command the division, the lack of qualified officers left it under the command of its senior colonel, a Virginian, John Brockenbrough. Brockenbrough had more political connections than military ability and inspired little confidence in his brigade. [24]

His third brigade came from Mississippi and North Carolina and was commanded by Brigadier General Joe Davis whose uncle was President Jefferson Davis. Davis had served on his uncle’s staff for months and had no combat experience. [25] One author noted that Davis’s promotion to Brigadier General “as unadulterated an instance of nepotism as the record of the Confederacy offers.” [26] Davis’s subordinate commanders were no better, one, Colonel William Magruder was so incompetent that J.E.B. Stuart suggested that “he have his commission revoked.” Likewise, only one of the nine field grade officers in his brigade had military training, and that from the Naval Academy. [27] A more poorly trained group of senior officers could hardly have been found.

Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew

Heth’s largest brigade was new to the army. Commanded by the North Carolina academic Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew, it had no combat experience. However, Pettigrew was considered a strong leader and served as a volunteer in Italy where he observed modern combat. He was badly wounded at Seven Pines and thinking his wound to be mortal “he refused to permit his men to leave the ranks to carry him to the rear.” [28] He was captured but later paroled and returned to the army later in the year.

Hill was under the impression that Meade’s army was still miles away, having just come from meeting Lee who assured him that “the enemy are still at Middleburg,” (Maryland) “and have not yet struck their tents.” [29] With that assurance, Heth decided to send Pettigrew’s brigade on the foraging expedition to Gettysburg on June 30th. An officer present noted that Heth instructed Pettigrew “to go to Gettysburg with three of his regiments present…and a number of wagons for the purpose of collecting commissary and quartermaster stores for the use of the army.” [30]

However, Heth instructed Pettigrew in no uncertain terms not to “precipitate a fight” should he encounter “organized troops” of the Army of the Potomac. [31] Heth was specific in his after-action report that “It was told to Pettigrew that he might find in the town in possession of a home guard,…but if contrary to expectations, he should find any organized troops capable of making resistance., or any part of the Army of the Potomac, he should not attack it.” [32]

With that in mind one has to ask the question as to why Heth would employ “so many men on a long, tiring march, especially as without a cavalry escort he took the risk of sending them into a trap,” when his “objects hardly justified” using such a large force. [33] Likewise, it has to be asked why the next day in light of Lee’s standing orders “not to provoke an engagement,” that Hill would send two divisions, two-thirds of his corps on a reconnaissance mission. Some have said that Hill would have had to move to Gettysburg on July 1st anyway due to the forage needs of the army, [34] but this is not indicated in any of Hill or Heth’s reports.

As his troops neared Gettysburg Pettigrew observed the Federal cavalry of Buford’s 1st Cavalry Division as they neared the town. He received another report “indicating that drumming could be heard in the distance – which might mean infantry nearby since generally cavalry generally used only bugles.” [35] At this point, Pettigrew prudently, and in accordance with his orders not to precipitate a fight “elected to withdraw rather than risk battle with a foe of unknown size and composition.” [36] His troops began their retrograde at 11 a.m. leaving Buford’s cavalry to occupy the town at ridges. On Confederate wrote “in coming in contact with the enemy, had quite a little brush, but being under orders not to bring a general engagement fell back, followed by the enemy.” [37]

Upon returning to Cashtown, Pettigrew told Hill and Heth that “he was sure that the force occupying Gettysburg was a part of the Army of the Potomac” but Hill and Heth discounted Pettigrew’s report. [38] “Heth did not think highly of such wariness” and “Hill agreed with Heth” [39] Hill believed that nothing was in Gettysburg “except possibly a cavalry vidette.” [40] Hill was not persuaded by Pettigrew or Pettigrew’s aide Lieutenant Louis Young who had previously served under Hill and Pender who reported that the “troops that he saw were veterans rather than Home Guards.” [41] Hill reiterated that he did not believe “that any portion of the Army of the Potomac was up” but then according to Young, Hill “expressed the hope that it was, as this was the place he wanted it to be.” [42] The West Point Graduates Hill and Heth manifested an often-seen “disdain for citizen soldiers…a professional questioning a talented amateur’s observations” [43] It was a disdain that would cost the Confederacy dearly in the days to come.

Pettigrew was “aghast at Hill’s nonchalant attitude,” [44] and Young was dismayed. He later recalled that “a spirit of unbelief” seemed to cloud Hill and Heth’s thinking. [45] In later years he wrote; “Blindness in part seems to have come over our commanders, who slow to believe in the presence of an organized army of the enemy, thought that there must be a mistake in the report taken back by General Pettigrew.” [46]

Heth then asked Hill since neither believed Pettigrew’s report “whether Hill would have any objection to taking his division to Gettysburg again to get those shoes. Hill replied “none in the world.” [47] Douglas Southall Freeman wrote “On those four words fate hung” [48] and then, in “that incautious spirit, Hill launched Harry Heth’s division down the Chambersburg Pike and into battle at Gettysburg.” [49] That fateful decision was made by men who ignored the obvious, and who by not believing the reports of Pettigrew and Young, began the Eastern theater’s contribution to the twin defeats that doomed the Confederacy.

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A Fateful Decision

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