July 1st at Gettysburg, Heth vs. Buford: Arrogant Inexperience against Experience and Cunning Ability

Jul 02, 2023

This is a section of my draft Gettysburg Staff Ride Text. The massive work will become my Gettysburg trilogy. This text is still a draft, and it is evolving. Since I began it while on faculty at the Joint Forces Staff College, I have obtained collections of unit histories, after-action reports, and letters which I will use to enrich the narrative. One thing that sets my work apart from many other accounts of Gettysburg is how I try to draw out the humanity of the individuals involved in the battle, and my work to discuss the strategic, operational, and tactical choices that impacted the battle and show the leadership qualities, and the character of the people who made them.

I did that in my book Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: Religion and the Politics of Race in the Civil War Era and Beyond. That book began as an introductory chapter of the staff ride text to show my students that while it is important to understand the purely military aspects of a campaign, it is equally important to understand the ideas and ideology that motivate people to go to war and to fight. My second book, which I am working on editing this summer, A Great War in an Age of Revolutionary Change, was also an introductory chapter to the staff ride text. It deals with the broader military, economic, sociological, informational, political, religious, diplomatic, and technological changes, innovations, and advances that took place before, during, and in the aftermath of the war. These are things that still impact our lives today.

This section follows my last post and deals with Brigadier General John Buford’s delaying action against Harry Heth’s Division of A.P. Hill’s Third Corps on the morning of July 1st, 1863.

Despite the warnings of Johnston Pettigrew, Major General Harry Heth, with the approval and blessing of his corps commander Lieutenant General A.P. Hill, arose on the morning of July 1st, 1863, and formed his division for its march to Gettysburg. But, it was an inauspicious start to a very bad day for Heth and his division. Somehow the orders to advance had not gotten to his units to begin the advance at 5 a.m., and as such, “there was haste to the early morning’s preparations that caught some off guard,” even his regimental commanders. [1]

On the night of June 30th, 1863, A.P. Hill’s actions show a commander who was confused and uncertain. The confidence that he and Heth showed in rejecting Pettigrew and Young’s reports of Federal troops in Gettysburg left “most, if not all the commanding officers in Hill’s corps…unprepared for what happened.” [2] Few commanders expected that there would be a fight on July 1st. Lieutenant Lewis Young wrote “I doubt if any of the commanders of brigades, except General Pettigrew, believed that we were marching to battle, a weakness on their part which rendered them unprepared for what was about to happen.” [3]

Hill sent a message to Ewell of Second Corps telling that officer that “I intended to advance the next morning and discover what was in my front.” [4] He also sent word of Pettigrew’s discovery of Union cavalry to Lee’s headquarters, but his warning apparently gave Lee little cause for concern. Porter Alexander noted that on the night of June 30th that he visited Lee’s headquarters and found the conversation to be “unusually careless & jolly. Certainly there was no premonition that the next morning was to open a great battle of the campaign.” [5] Hill also sent a courier to Anderson instructing him to bring up his division on July 1st and he instructed Heth that “Pender’s division also would be ordered through Cashtown as a reserve if Heth ran into serious trouble.” [6]

Since a reconnaissance is normally conducted by small elements, the fact that Hill committed his two divisions present to such a mission demonstrated his confusion about both the nature of what he might face and to the intentions of Robert E. Lee. One has to remember that Lee, like his corps commanders, was operating blind, in part due to Stuart’s absence but also due to the poor employment of the cavalry that should have been available to them. Hill and Heth had no idea what they faced at Gettysburg and disregarded the warnings of their own people. Thus it is hard to believe that Hill did not expect the possibility of action. Likewise it is distinctly possible that Heth, despite his orders “may have had more on his mind than shoes and information when he made his advance towards Gettysburg.” [7]

Several critics have made this point, among them Major John Mosby the Confederate cavalry leader and guerrilla fighter who wrote: “Hill and Heth in their reports, to save themselves from censure, call the first day’s action a reconnaissance; this is all an afterthought….They wanted to conceal their responsibility for the defeat.” [8] A more contemporary writer, Jennings Wise noted that Hill’s orders “were specific not to bring on an action, but his thirst for battle was unquenchable, and…he rushed on, and…took the control of the situation out of the hands of his commander-in-chief.” [9] Heth in later years made an unsubstantiated claim that “A courier came from Gen. Lee, with a dispatch ordering me to get those shoes even if I encountered some resistance.” [10] That appears unlikely as Mosby noted that no one ordered Hill to advance and Lee “would never have sanctioned it.” [11] Neither Lee or any of his staff collaborate Heth’s claim and the judicious Porter Alexander who had been in Lee’s headquarters the night of June 30th, he wrote that “Hill’s movement to Gettysburg was made on his own accord, and with knowledge that he would find the enemy’s cavalry in possession.” [12]

The advance to contact was marred by Heth’s inexperience compounded by the illness of A.P. Hill who on the morning of July 1st had “awakened feeling very ill, too sick to mount his horse… although no diagnosis was made, he was probably suffering from overstrained nerves.” [13] Hill’s absence left Heth, an inexperienced division commander “without any sage counsel” [14] and Heth began to commit a series of costly errors. Heth understood from Hill that his mission was a job that normally would be assigned to cavalry: “to ascertain what force was at Gettysburg, and if he found infantry opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an engagement.” [15]

Heth advanced without the caution of a commander who had been told that enemy forces were likely opposing him. Even though he disbelieved the reports some amount of judicious caution should have been indicated. Instead, for reasons unknown Heth had his men advance as if they were conducting a routine movement. He led his advance with his assigned artillery battalion commanded by Major William Pegram. He followed with Archer’s veteran but depleted brigade and Davis’s inexperienced brigade. Davis compounded the situation and led his movement with his new and untested regiments the 42nd Mississippi and 55th North Carolina, leaving his two veteran regiments the 2nd and 11th Mississippi in the rear guarding army stores. [16] It was a curious order of march for it left Johnston’s Pettigrew’s brigade behind both Archer and Davis’s brigades despite the fact that it was closer to Gettysburg than any other brigade. It also had recent eyes on contact with the enemy and knew the ground and what was ahead of them. Pettigrew’s brigade was followed by Colonel John Brockenbrough’s Virginia brigade. It is hard to know why Heth did this but one can speculate that it might have been because of Pettigrew’s insistence on the type of Federal forces in their front the previous day, and a possible desire to prove him wrong.

As Heth’s troops advanced to Marsh Creek they encountered the cavalry videttes or pickets of the 8th Illinois Cavalry posted on the high ground just east of the creek. [17] The discovery of these forces was unanticipated by the Confederates leading the column. One of Pegram’s gunners recalled: “We moved forward leisurely smoking and chatting as we rode along, not dreaming of the proximity of the enemy.” [18] Most assumed that the movement “was simply one more part of the army’s concentration of forces” and Brockenbrough told the commander of the 55th Virginia that “we might meet some of Ewell’s command or Stuarts.” [19] Pettigrew attempted to warn Archer prior to the march of the topography of the area and “a certain road which the Yankees might use to hit his flank, and the dangers of McPherson’s Ridge. Archer listened, believed not, marched on unprepared…” [20] Heth, who should have better anticipated the situation based on Pettigrew’s reports of the previous day demonstrated why one author called him “an intellectual lightweight.” [21] Heth told an officer from the Army of the Potomac after the war, “I did not know any of your people were north of the Potomac.” [22]

Refer a friend

Brigadier General John Buford

If Heth was inexperienced and knew little of the Federal forces arrayed before him and what forces were moving towards Gettysburg, his opponent, Brigadier General John Buford was his opposite in nearly every respect. Buford was born in Kentucky and came from a long line of family who had fought in both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. He was an 1848 graduate of West Point who was commissioned in the Dragoons but too late to serve in Mexico. Instead, he served on the Great Plains against the Sioux and on peacekeeping duty in the bitterly divided State of Kansas. Later he served in the Utah War in 1858. His family held Southern sympathies; his father was a Democrat who had opposed Abraham Lincoln.

At the beginning of the war, the governor of Kentucky offered Buford a commission in that state’s militia. At the time Kentucky was still an “undeclared border slave state” and Buford loyal to his oath refused and wrote later “I sent him word that I was a Captain in the United States Army and I intend to remain one.” [23] However, his southern ties kept him from field command until the politically well connected ill-fated, Major General John Pope “could unreservedly vouch for his loyalty wrangled for his command of a brigade of cavalry.” [24] After Pope’s defeat at Second Bull Run in August 1862, Buford returned to staff duties until January 1863, when he was again given a brigade.

Buford was passed over by Hooker for command of the new cavalry corps in favor of Alfred Pleasanton who was eleven days his senior when Hooker reorganized the army before Chancellorsville. In later years Hooker agreed that Buford “would have been a better man for the position of chief” [25] for the Cavalry Corps, but in retrospect, Buford’s passover for corps command was good fortune for the Army of the Potomac on June 30th and July 1st, 1863. Despite being passed over, Buford a consummate professional, fought well at Brandy Station for which he was recommended for promotion and command of his division. [26]

One of Meade’s staff officers, Theodore Lyman gave this description of Buford:

“He is one of the best of the officers…and is a singular looking party. Figurez-vous a compactly built man of middle height, with a tawny mustache and a little, triangular gray eye, whose expression is determined, not to say sinister. His ancient corduroys are tucked into a pair of ordinary cowhide boots, his blue blouse is ornamented with holes; from which one pocket thereof peeps a huge pipe, while the other is fat with a tobacco pouch. Notwithstanding this get-up he is a very soldierly looking man. Hype is of a good natured disposition, but is not to be trifled with.” [27]

On the night of June 30th Buford prepared for battle. Unlike Hill and Heth, he understood exactly what he was facing. He met with “reliable men” most likely from the Bureau of Military Intelligence operated by David McConaughy as to the composition of Lee’s forces. [28] Buford knew his business; he took the time to reconnoiter the ridges west of Gettysburg and posted videttes as far as Marsh Creek. He deployed one brigade under Colonel Thomas Devin to the north and west of the town, Colonel William Gamble’s brigade was deployed to the west, its main line being on McPherson’s ridge. Buford planned “a defense in depth, fighting his men dismounted, using the series of ridgelines west of Gettysburg to hamper and delay the Rebel infantry he was certain would come “booming along” the Chambersburg Pike in the morning.” [29]

Noting that the ground was favorable to the defense and giving battle Buford sent messages to Reynolds as to the situation. He warned Reynolds that “A.P. Hill’s corps is massed just back of Cashtown, about 9 miles from this place.” He also noted the location of Confederate pickets only four miles west of Gettysburg. [30] Devin’s troopers also identified elements of Ewell’s corps north of the town. Buford had accurately informed his superiors of what was before him, information that they needed for the day of battle.

According to his signals officer, Buford spent the night “anxious, more so than I ever saw him” [31] He discussed the situation with Devin who did not believe that the Confederates would move on Gettysburg in the morning. Colonel Devin thought if there were any threats that “he could handle anything that could come up in the next 24 hours.” [32] Buford rejected Devin’s argument and told him “No you won’t…. They will attack you in the morning and they will come booming – skirmishers three deep. You will have to fight like the devil to hold your own.” [33]

Reynolds too saw the importance of the position and elected to fight. He “ordered Buford to hold onto it to the last,” believing that if Buford could “buy enough time, he might get his infantry into line “before the enemy should seize the point.” [34]

As Archer and Davis’s troops advanced in the early hours of July 1^st their march was uneventful until they reached Marsh Creek. There they encountered the troopers of the 8th Illinois, one of whom, Lieutenant Marcellus Jones, took a carbine from one of his sergeants saying “Hold on George, give me the honor of opening this ball,” and at about 7:30 a.m. Jones fired the first shot of th Battle of Gettysburg. [35]

Heth had wanted to advance in column as long as possible “but the Yankee cavalry’s stiff resistance had ended that hope.” [36] He rode forward and ordered Archer and Davis’s troops to advance skirmishers with the support of Pegram’s artillery. This slowed the Confederate advance considerably. Heth wrote in his after action report that “it became evident that there were infantry, cavalry and artillery in and around the town.” [37] But instead of “feeling out the enemy” as directed by Hill, Heth “ordered Archer and Davis “to move forward and occupy the town.” [38] A chaplain in Brockenbrough’s brigade reported that one of Heth’s aide’s came up and reported “General Heth is ordered to move on Gettysburg, and fight or not as he wishes.” The chaplain heard one of the officers near him say, “We must fight them; no division general will turn back with such orders.” [39]

The fight that Harry Heth and A.P. Hill had been order not to precipitate was now on. Heth’s inexperience was more than matched by the cunning and brilliant Buford, whose troopers now fought a masterful delaying action that enabled John Reynolds to lead the Federal First and Eleventh Corps to come up and join the battle.

Dedicated to the Proposition that All Men are Created Equal

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